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KENNETH K. LUCE and RALPH I. HEIKKINEN
The recent session of the Wisconsin Legislature considered at least
six, and enacted into law three, amendments of considerable significance
to the future structure and development of Wisconsin business corpora-
tions. It is the purpose of this paper to sketch the outline of these
amendments, to indicate their principal purposes and salient character-
istics, as observed by the authors, and to discuss briefly some of the
problems inherent in the legislation. Citations have been placed in
the footnotes because they are leading cases or are usefully illus-
trative or recent. No attempt has been made to append the copious
footnotes which, apparently, are the hallmark of scholarly research.
BILLS INTRODUcED BUT NOT ENAcTED INTO LAW
Three bills were introduced but not enacted into law. One of these
proposed (1) to amend Wisconsin Statutes, section 180.14(1), to make
clear the power of Wisconsin corporations to hold meetings of stock-
holders and directors outside the state and (2) to amend section 182.0-
(5) to vest in the directors power to amend, adopt and repeal by-laws
to the extent permitted by the articles of incorporation. Since by-laws
often directly affect ordinary business operations, the necessity for
amendments is likely to arise in periods between stockholders' meet-
ings. Inasmuch as stockholders' meetings, especially with large corpor-
ations, involve delay as well as considerable expense, the latter provi-
sion would be helpful in adding some flexibility to normal business
operations and, in fact, is permitted by the statutes of most states.
Provision in the articles of incorporation that amendments made by
directors may be repealed by the stockholders and provision for stock-
holders' meetings callable upon stockholder initiative would seem to
provide ample safeguards against any abuse of power in the directors
to amend, adopt and repeal by-laws.
A second bill proposed a new section 182.18 to spell out the pro-
cedure for determining stockholders entitled to vote and to receive
dividends and a new sub-section 182.15 (3) to authorize provision in
articles of incorporation for cumulative voting. This provision assur-
ing minority interests, who wish it, representation on the board ,of
directors is now so widely adopted and accepted as a part of modem
corporate procedure that its inclusion in the Wisconsin Statutes should
clearly be only a question of time.
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A third bill, introduced but not passed, proposed to create section
182.01 (11) to clarify corporate power to make charitable contribu-
tions and to create section 182.16 to authorize director, executive com-
mittee and stockholder action by unanimous written consent upon any
matter without the necessity of a formal meeting. As a general rule,
directors have no authority or power to make gifts of corporate assets.
The former provision would simply have put beyond possible stock-
holder question charitable contributions which are now normal practice.
As to the latter provision, it is readily apparent that desirable flexibility
in corporate procedure would be given some corporations by its in-
clusions in the Wisconsin Statutes without too much danger of abuse,
so long as the unanimous consent requirement were retained.
BILLS ENACTED INTO LAW
(a) Minimum Capital Requirements
Chapter 575, Laws of 1947, amended Wisconsin Statutes, section
180.06 and related sections, to remove from organizational procedure
the requirements that one-half the authorized capital stock be sub-
scribed before the first meeting and that one-fifth thereof be paid in
before any transaction of business. Section 180.10 was repealed. This
latter section required that any amendment of the articles of incorpora-
tion increasing the authorized capital stock be accompanied upon its
filing with the Secretary of State by an affidavit of the president and
secretary that one half of the proposed increase had already been sub-
scribed and one fifth paid in, thus imposing the odd requirement that
increases in capital stock be partly subscribed and paid in before they
could be leagally authorized. These restrictive and confused require-
ments have been replaced by minimum capital requirements substan-
tially similar to those widely adopted in other jurisdictions. Hence-
forth, the original articles of incorporation must contain a statement
of "the minimum amount of capital with which the corporation will
commence business which shall not be less than $500," which minimum
must be subscribed before the first meeting, and paid in before busi-
ness is transacted. Amendments to articles increasing authorized capi-
tal stock will no longer be complicated by the necessity of affidavits
of compliance with minimum capital requirements. The old require-
ments were cumbersome and overly restrictive, particularly in view
of the fact that the extent to which they fulfilled their purpose of
furnishing protection to creditors was questionable to say the least.
The portion of section 180.06 (4) imposing liability for corporate debts
incurred during existence of a violation of the minimum capital re-
quirements upon "then existing" stockholders, signers of the articles,
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etc., has been retained.' Liability suffered under this section comes
from a legislative policy of paternalism toward corporate creditors,
and has little or no basis in any actual reliance by such creditors upon
publicly recorded recitals of compliance by corporate debtors with the
statutes respecting minimum capital. 2 Such liability may well come
as a wholly unexpected hardship to the stockholder who has not
participated in the business otherwise than as investor, and as an equal-
ly unexpected windfall to the creditor. The creditor who demands
assurance before extending credit will demand and rely upon a balance
sheet and, perhaps, a report of examination by independent credit men
or an accountant. This creditor will not lack for a remedy outside
section 180.06 (4) if the assurances made him are false. The amend-
ments to the statute, by making the minimum capital requirements
nominal, have cut the creditor's possible windfall under section 180.06
(4) to a remedy in the extreme case of sloppy corporate organization.
(b) Preferred Stock Changes - "Blank" stock
By Chapter 492, Laws of 1947, the provisions relating to preferred
stock contained in Wisconsin Statutes, section 182.13 (1), were ex-
tensively amended. First, the clause authorizing a corporation to pro-
vide "for a preference of such preferred stock not exceeding the par
value thereof, over the common stock in the distribution of the cor-
porate assets other than profits", was amended to read: "for a prefer-
ence of such preferred stock over the common stock in the distribution
of the corporate assets." As judicially construed, the clause as pre-
viously worded rendered nugatory any provision in corporate articles
awarding to holders of preferred stock any preference in assets upon
liqudation, in excess of the par value of the stock, except to the extent
that an earned surplus should be available against which such excess
could be charged.3 To state the matter more concretely, provision
could not be made for payment to preferred stockholders in every case
'The liability of stockholders under this section is statutory, and independent
of any corporate liability on the same debt. Payments of interest by a corpora-
tion on a note payable to a bank did not toll the statute of limitations against
the stockholders: Bank of Verona v. Stewart, 223 Wis. 577, 270 N.W. 534
(1937).
2 Consider the similar judicial and legislative policy underlying liability of stock-
holders to corporate creditors for stock not fully paid under the trust fund and
similar theories: Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. (84 U.S.) 610, 21 L. ed. 731 (1873);
Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117, 15 L.R.A.
470 (1892); Gogebic Investment Company v. Iron Chief Mining Company, 78
Wis. 427 (1891).
3 Hull v. Pfister & Vogel Leather Co., 235 Wis. 653, 294 N.W. 18 (1940), where
a corporation in liquidation had capital surplus which had resulted from a re-
duction of the par value of outstanding stock, but had no earned surplus. The
articles did not conflict with the statute. It was held, in an action for a declara-
tory judgment, that the preferred stock was not entitled to its premium, or to
accumulated dividends, but only to the par amount. See also Welch v. Land
Development Company, 246 Wis. 124, 16 N.W. (2d) 402 (1944).
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upon liquidation of a premium above par or of undeclared cumulated
dividends. This clause, together with the decisions interpreting it,
acted as a distinct limitation upon the liquidation preference which could
be given to preferred stock in the corporate articles. The amendment
clearly eliminates all such limitation and makes enforceable any liqui-
dation preference which the parties may care to include in the articles,
originally or by amendment. Under the statute as amended it will
be possible to authorize preferred stock with liquidation and redemp-
tion preferences much more attractive to investors, and therefore more
marketable, than has been possible heretofore.
The amended section 182.13 (1) adds to the original section author-
ity to provide in the articles: (1) "for one or more series of preferred
stock within any issue thereof, and for the designation thereof ;" (2)
"for the conversion or exchange of such stock into or for the conver-
sion or exchange of such stock into or for any other class of stock ;"
and (3) "for such other powers, preferences and rights and the
qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof not inconsistent with
law as may be desired," the last omnibus clause being added, no doubt,
to avoid so far as possible the ejusdem generis construction to which
the original section was clearly subject.
Finally, the amended section 182.13 (1) adds to the original section
authority to include in the articles, originally or through amendment,
"an express grant of such authority as it may then be desired to grant
to the board of directors to fix by resolution or resolutions the designa-
tion, the dividend rate, the conversion basis or rate, the sum payable
upon redemption, or any other power, preference and right, or qual-
ification, limitation or restriction which is not fixed in the original
articles, or such amendment." Provision is made for the filing of such
resolution or resolutions, which when filled as outlined in the amended
section are treated as an amendment to the articles of incorporation.
Thus for the first time corporations organized under Wisconsin
Statues are in position to authorize so-called "blank" preferred stock
by adding to the normal charter authority to issue preferred stock (1)
authority to issue the same in series and (2) a delegation to the board
of directors of power, by resolution, to designate each series and
define, to the extent indicated, its preferences, powers, rights, limita-
tions, etc.4 On the surface the amendment to section 182.13 (1) is
4 The corporation statutes of the following states authorize blank stock: Cali-
fornia Civil Code, Sec. 290, paragraph 5; Illinois, Business Corporation Act,
Sec. 15, Il. Rev. Stat., (1945), Ch. 32, Sec. 157.15; Minnesota, Business Cor-
poration Act, Sec. 3, I (e) ; Nebraska, General Corporation Act, Rev. Stat.
Neb. (1943) v. 1, Ch. 21, Secs. 121-127 incl.; Maryland, Corporation Law,
Public General Laws, Art. 23, Sec. 42 (2) (1945) ; New York Stock Corpora-
tion Law, Secs. 5, 11 (1946) ; Delaware, General Corporation Law, Rev. Code,
Ch. 65, Sec. 13: "Every corporation shall have power to issue one or more
classes of stock or one or more series of stock within any class thereof, any
1947)
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designed to promote the use of preferred stock as a completely pliable
and flexible device in the hands of management for the raising of corpo-
rate capital through (1) elimination of statutory control of the terms
and conditions of the preferred stock contract, and (2) creation of
authority for article provisions delegating to directors a blank check
authority to write, as of the time the stock is marketed, at least those
terms and conditions of the contract which are directly affected by
the financial market and cannot be satisfactorily written until that time.
Such flexibility tends to make the preferred stock device at least as
practical, attractive, and feasible a method of raising capital in many
situations as is the debenture, the short or medium-long term collateral
note issue, and other categories of purely creditor securities. In view
or all of which classes may be of stock with par value or stock without par
value, with such voting powers, full or limited, or without voting powers and
in such series and with such designations, preferences and relative, participat-
ing, optional or other special rights, and qualifications, limitations or restric-
tions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed in the Certificate of Incorpora-
tion or of any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or resolutions provid-
ing for the issue of such stock adopted by the Board of Directors pursuant
to authority expressly vested in it by the provisions of the Certificate of In-
corporation or of any amendment thereto. The power to increase or decrease
or otherwise adjust the capital stock as in this Chapter elsewhere provided
shall apply to all or any such classes of stock Any preferred or special stock
may be made subject to redemption at such time or times and at such price or
prices and may be issued in such series, with such designations, preferences
and relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications,
limitations or restrictions thereof as shall be stated and expressed in the Cer-
tificate of Incorporation, or any amendment thereto, or in the resolution or
resolutions providing for the issue of such stock adopted by the Board of
Directors as hereinabove provided. * * * ". Compare the provisions quoted
as follows from Ohio, General Corporation Act, General Code, Sec. 8623-4:
"Any number of natural persons, not less than three * * * may form a corpo-
ration for profit by subscribing, acknowledging and filing in the office of the
secretary of state articles of incorporation, setting forth: * * * 4. The maxi-
mum number and the par value per share of shares with par value, and the
maximum number of shares without par value, which the corporation is au-
thorized to have outstanding; and, if the shares are to be classified-(a) the
designation of each class and the number and par value per share, if any, of
the shares of each class; and (b) the express terms and provisions of the
shares of each class. The express terms and provisions may include statements
specifying * * * the division of any class into series, the designation and num-
ber of shares of each series, and any other relative, participating, optional or
other special rights and privileges of, and qualifications, limitations or re-
strictions on, the rights of holders of shares of any class or series.
"The express terms and provisions of shares of different series of any par-
ticular class shall be identical except that there may be variations in respect
of any or all of the following: dividend rate, dates of payment of dividends
and dates from which they are cumulative, redemption rights and price, liqui-
dation price, sinking fund requirements, conversion rights, and restrictions on
issuance of shares of the same series or of any other class or series.
"By the express terms and provisions of the shares of any class, the board
of directors may be authorized, subject to such limitations as may be stated
therein, to adopt amendments to the articles, in respect of any unissued or
treasury shares of any class, to fix or alter the division of such shares of each
series, the dividend rate, dates of payment of dividends and dates from which
they are cumulative, redemption rights and price, liquidation price, sinking fund
requirements, conversion rights, and restrictions on issuance of shares of the
same series or of any other class or series."
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of the trend indicated by this amendment to section 182.13 (1), it is
interesting, if not wholly relevant, to note at least one statutory re-
striction upon preferred stock which still remains in Wisconsin. Stock
preferred as to dividends or corporate assets, or subject to redemption
at a fixed price, must still carry a par value.5
Preferred stock generally lies somewhere in the border land between
the proprietor and creditor equities in corporate assets. It may be
said to represent actually a creditor interest, but for two important
qualifications: (1) receipt of income is dependent more or less upon
corporate earnings and director discretion and (2) there is usually
no maturity date except at the option of the corporation. Other dis-
tinctions tend to shade together. Preferred stock voting rights can
usually be restricted or denied,6 while on the other side of the dividing
line between creditor and proprietor equities it is not too unusual to
find voting power awarded to bondholders or debenture holders in
certain defined contingencies. With this point of view considered,
it appears natural enough to provide what has just been provided in
the Wisconsin statute. Preferred stock carries obvious advantages in
the corporate favor over mortgage bonds, collateral notes, or even
debentures, and if the stock can be marketed at a particular time it
is reasonable that the directors should find it as convenient to issue
the preferred stock to raise the needed capital as to issue bonds or
notes. Without the blank check power, the directors may face a money
market demanding a seven per-cent return, and have available only
unissued preferred stock carrying a five per-cent dividend. The alter-
natives will be to issue notes or bonds, to issue the preferred stock at
a discount, or to amend the articles to authorize a new stock issue which
will involve a stockholders' special meeting and related corporate pro-
cedure. Other portions of the preferred stock contract, in addition to
the dividend rate, which are directly responsive to money market con-
ditions, and as to which directors can make benefiicial use of the blank
check power, are redemption and liquidation prices, provisions for sink-
ing fund, and perhaps for rights of conversion into other classes of
stock.
The question arises as to whether it is advisable to permit delega-
tion to directors of power to write the contract as to matters other
than those enumerated above. It leads nowhere to talk in terms of
5 Wis. Stats. 182.14(1); "Any corporation, * * * may, if so provided in
its articles of incorporation or in an amendment thereof, issue shares of stock(other than stock preferred as to dividends or preferred as to its distributive
share of the assets of the corporation or subject to redempjtion at a fixed
price) without any nominal or par value."
6Wis. Stats. 182.13(1): "Any corporation may, in its original articles, or
by amendment thereto adopted by a three-fourths vote of the stock entitled to
vote, provide for preferred stock; *** for denying or restricting the voting
power of such preferred stock * * "; Gottschalk v. Avalon Realty Co., 249
Wis. 78, 23 N.W. (2d) 606 (1946).
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abuse of power. The point is that unlimited delegation will mean just
what it says; power to write the contract in full, for instance to create
dividend and liquidation preferences between different series of pre-
ferred stock within the same issue. Perhaps dangers of abuse will be
minimized through enforcement by the Department of Securities of
full disclosure to prospective investors of the scope of delegated dir-
ector power.
Even under statutes such as the one in Delaware, which leave the
door open for seemingly unlimited delegation in the articles of power
to the directors, it has been the general practice in the preparation of
article provisions authorizing serial preferred stock to limit the power
of directors to the designation of the respective series and the number
of shares to be included in each, and to the control of such matters
as dividend rates, conversion rights, redemption and liquidation prices,
and sinking fund requirements.7 Many of the statutes authorizing
7 Berle, "Corporate Devices for iluting Stock Participations," 31 Col.
L. Rev. 1239 at 1263 (1931). There follows an example of article provision
governing director authority to write preferred stock rights by resolution,
taken from an actual set of articles recently filed in another state:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Article Fourth or by the resolution
or resolutions of the Board of Directors providing for the issue of any series
of Preference Stock, the Preference Stock may be issued from time to time
in any amount, not exceeding in the aggregate the total number of shares there-
of hereinbefore authorized, as Preference Stock of one or more series, as
hereinafter provided. All shares of any one series of Preference Stock shall
be alike in every particular, each series thereof shall be distinctly designated
by letter or descriptive words, and all series of Preference Stock shall rank
equally and be identical in all respects except as permitted by the provisions
of this Part III of this Article Fourth.
"Authority is hereby expressly granted to and vested in the Board of Di-
rectors from time to time to issue the Preference Stock as Preference Stock
of any series, and in connection with the creation of each such series to fix by
the resolution or resolutions providing for the issue of shares thereof the
designations, preferences and relative, participating, optional or other special
rights, and qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, of such series, to
the full extent now or hereafter permitted by the laws of the State of-,
in respect of the matters set forth in the following subdivisions (a) to (h),
inclusive:
(a) the designation of such series;
(b) the dividend rate of such series;
(c) the redemption price or prices per share of such series;
(d) the preference or preferences of the shares of such series over the
Common Stock as to both earnings and assets in the event of any liquidation,
dissolution or winding up of the Corporation;
(e) whether or not the shares of such series shall be entitled to the bene-
fits of a sinking fund to be applied to the purchase or redemption of such
series, and if so entitled, the amount of such fund and the manner of its
application;
(f) whether or not the shares of such series shall be made convertible into,
or exchangeable for, shares of any class or classes or of any other series of
the same or any other class or classes of stock of the Corporation, and, if
made so convertible or exchangeable, the conversion price or prices or the
rates of exchange, and the adjustments, if any, at which such conversion or
exchange may be made;
(g) whether or not the issues of any additional shares of such series or any
future series in addition to such series shall be subject to restrictions in ad-
dition to the restrictions on the issue of future series imposed by Subdivision
[Vol. 31
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blank stock restrict to a definite list the matters which may be delegated
by the articles to the directors, and some limit expressly the prefer-
ences which may be created between different series of stock within
the same issue.8
The new Wisconsin statute is of the extremely liberal type, simi-
lar to that in Delaware, 9 under which it apparently is possible through
H of Part IV of this Article Fourth or in the resolution or resolutions fixing
the terms of any series of Preference Stock theretofore issued pursuant to
this Article Fourth; and(h) any other voting powers, preferences and relative, participating, optional
and other special rights, and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions there-
of, of such series, not inconsistent with this Article Fourth.
"The Board of Directors may from time to time increase the number of
shares of any series of Preference Stock already created by providing that any
unissued shares of Preference Stock shall constitute part of such series and/or
may decrease (but not below the number of shares thereof then outstanding)
the number of shares of any series of Preference Stock already created by pro-
viding that any unissued shares previously assigned to such series shall no
longer constitute part thereof. The Board of Directors is hereby empowered
to classify or reclassify any unissued Preference Stock by fixing or altering
the terms thereof in respect of the matters set forth above in subdivisions (a)
to (h), inclusive, and by assigning the same to an existing or newly created
series from time to time before the issuance of such Preference Stock.
"IV. The powers, preference and rights, and the qualifications, limitations
and restrictions thereof, applicable to the Preference Stock of all series, except
such as th Board of Directors is hereinbefore authorized to fix with respect to
different series of Preference Stock, are as follows: * * * "8 Attention is directed to the quoted provisions of the Ohio General Corpo-
rations Act, in footnote 4. See also: Illinois Business Corporation Act, Sec.
15, Ill. Fev. Stat. (1945) Ch. 32, Sec. 157.15, the pertinent provisions of which
read: " * * * Any or all of the series of any such class and the variations in
the relative rights and preferences as between different series may be fixed and
determined by th articles of incorporation, provided that all shares of the same
class shall be identical except as to the following relative rights and prefer-
ences, in respect of any or all of which there may be variations between dif-
ferent series:
(a) The rate of dividend.
(b) The price at and the terms and conditions on which shares may be re-
deemed.
(c) The amount payable upon shares in event of involuntary liquidation.(d) The amount payable upon shares in event of voluntary liquidation.
(e) Sinking fund provisions for the redemption or purchase of shares.(f) The terms and conditions on which shares may be converted, if the
shares of any series are issued with the privilege of conversion.
"If the articles of incorporation shall expressly vest authority in the board
of directors, then, to the extent that the articles of incorporation shall not
have established series and fixed and determined the variations in the relative
rights and preferences as between series, the board of directors shall have
authority to divide any or all of such classes into series and, within the limi-
tations set forth in this section, fix and determine the relative rights and prefer-
ences of the shares of any series so established; provided that such authority
of the board of directors shall be subject to such further limitations, if any,
as are stated in the articles of incorporation and shall always be subject to the
limitation that the board of directors shall not create a sinking fund in respect
of any series unless provision for a sinking fund at least as beneficial to all
issued and outstanding shares of the same class shall either then exist or be at
the same time created * * * ". See also New York Stock Corporation Law,
Sec. 11 (1946) ; California Civil Code, Sec. 290, paragraph 5; Minnesota, Busi-
ness Corporation Act, Sec. 3, I (e).
9 See the quotation in footnote 4 from the Delaware General Corporation Act.
The Nebraska General Corporation Act, enacted in 1941, follows closely on this
problem the provisions of the Delaware Act: Rev. Stat. Nebraska (1943) v. 1.,
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
provision in the articles to give the directors power to designate the
various series within an authorized issue, the amount of stock in
each series, and to write in full the terms of the stock contract in
each series, As a practical matter the scope of delegation in any
given situation will depend much upon respective bargaining positions.
Where the taker of the first series of a preferred issue is to be a
single large investor, it may be assumed that is will adequately pro-
tect its interests against prior preferences in subsequent series. Where
the contemplated taker is the unorganized general public, the burden
of supervision must fall upon the investment banker or ultimately
upon the D e p a r t m e n t of Securities. It must be understood that
unlimited delegation by provision in the articles means power in the
directors to write the contract for each series free from the check
of a stockholders' meeting and vote. Theoretically, no limitation ap-
pears in the statute against directors who hold such power creating
broad differences between different series of preferred stock within
a particular issue; for instance, voting power awarded to Series "B"
which was denied to Series "A", conversion rights provided for Series
"B" which Series "A" did not receive, or provision of a sinking fund
for series "B" where none, or one less beneficial, had been provided
for Series "A". Such a statute achieves the utmost in flexibility, so
desirable to management, but at the same time may result, conceivably
from careless or loose drafting of article provisions relating to pre-
ferred stock, in the placing of power to abuse, dangerous to investors,
in the hands of an irresponsible board of directors in position to do
considerable damage before the next annual stockholders' meeting.10
The responsibility of the lawyer in the matter of careful draftsmanship
is clearly indicated.
(c) Consolidation and Merger
Chapter 15, Laws of 1947, creating Wisconsin Statutes, section
181.06, provides a simple and effective means of accomplishing the
unification of two or more corporate business organizations into one
legal unit. The form of procedure adopted is similar to that enacted
in numerous other states in the not too distant past, and is known as
statutory consolidation or merger.1 ' Generally the procedure begins
Ch. 21, Secs. 121-127 incl.; see also Maryland Corporation Law, Public General
Laws, Art. 23, Sec. 42 2) (1945).
10 It is interesting to note that the Model State Business Corporation Act, pre-
pared by the Corporation Law Committee of the Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Mercantile Law of the American Bar Association (1946), does not
contain any provision authorizing blank stock.21 With minor changes, for instance addition of a requirement that dissenting
shareholders file objection with the corporation in writing at least forty-eight
hours before the stockholders' meeting called to vote on the plan, the Wiscon-
sin statute follows closely Sections 62-70 inclusive, of the Model State Business
Corporation Act, submitted October 28, 1946, by the Corporation Law Com-
mittee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law of the
American Bar Association.
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with director action upon a plan of merger or consolidation, setting
forth the names of the corporations involved and the name of any
new corporation contemplated in the plan, the manner and basis of
converting the stock of the participating corporations into that of the
surviving or new corporation, the matters normally required to be
set forth in the articles of a new corporation by section 180.02, and
such other provisions as are deemed necessary or desirable. Stock-
holder action then follows at a meeting called in the manner provided
in the statute. If the plan is approved by at least two-thirds of the
stock entitled to vote and by two-thirds of any class of stock entitled
to vote as a class, then articles of merger or consolidation containing
the material prescribed are filed with the Secretary of State and re-
corded in much the same manner as original articles of incorporation
are filed pursuant to section 180.02 (2). Recording is required in the
office of the Register of Deeds in each county where the original
articles of a participating corporation are recorded, and in the county
"where the merged or consolidated corporation is to be located", and
the merger or consolidation becomes effective upon "the due recording".
When the merger or consolidation becomes effective, the new or sur-
viving corporation emerges, and the participating corporations cease
to exist as separate entities. By operation of law, without other or
further procedure or legal action, the new or surviving corporation is
vested with the property and other legal rights of the participating
corporations and subjected to all their obligations and liabilities. Pro-
vision is made also for merger or consolidation of Wisconsin corpora-
tions with foreign corporations under specified conditions.
REMEDIES OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS
Both the amendment of section 182.13 (1), relating to preferred
stock, and the consolidation and merger statute give to the majority
stockholder interest in Wisconsin corporations powers with respect to
the corporate contract which they did not have before these statutes
were enacted. By amendment to the articles a two-thirds majority may
give to preferred stockholders a preference in the distribution of the
corporate assets upon redemption or liquidation without regard to the
existence of earned surplus. The same majority may provide for ap-
parently unlimited authority in directors to write the terms of preferred
stock contracts for issues once authorized, and for the issue thereof in
series. The same majority may make the preferred stock exchangeable
or convertible into any other class of stock. Finally, it may proceed
under statutory procedure to merge or consolidate the corporation into
a surviving or a new corporation, either of Wisconsin or of another
state, and make binding upon dissenting shareholders "the manner and
basis of converting the shares of each merging (or consolidating)
19471
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corporation into shares or other securities or obligations of the sur-
viving (or new) corporation." On the face of things the two-thirds
majority is given power, through the merger or consolidation proce-
dure, to eliminate accrued, cumluative dividends on preferred stock.
The Bradley Knitting Company case1 2 permitted several changes in
the future preference rights of the preferred stock there involved,
under authority given the majority in sections 180.07 (two-thirds), and
182.13 (1) (three-fourths), but did not hold that accrued cumulative
dividends could be wiped out under the authority to amend articles
contained in those sections. That question is so far undecided in Wis-
consin, but sections 180.07, 4nd 182.13, certainly contain no clear au-
thority for such action. Power to make changes "in relation to any
preferred stock referred to in this section" hardly seems adequate,
especially in view of the cases holding that the preferred stockholder's
claim to accrued cumlative dividends smacks sufficiently of a debt to
make it something more than a mere preference. 13 Majority power to
eliminate accrued dividends is more easily found in the statutory au-
thority to provide for the manner and basis of converting the shares of
the corporation into "shares, or other securities, or obligations" of an-
other corporation in a merger or consolidation plan. And some support
for this position is available in the amazing series of Delaware deci-
sions, in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that it was uncon-
stitutional to eliminate accrued cumulative dividends by majority action
under the Delaware amending section (26), but constitutional to do it
as a part of the consolidation or merger procedure provided in the
Delaware statutes.14
The Wisconsin problem with respect to the constitutionality of
the legislation discussed in this paper, as applied to the rights of stock-
holders who acquired their shares before its enactment, has been con-
sidered at length in a recent article in this Review. 15 Since that article
was written, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a decision subscribing to the
minority view as to the scope of legislative power to amend corpora-
tion statutes, has decided that a statute permitting the elimination of
accrued dividends could not constitutionally be applied by the corporate
majority against stockholders who acquired their shares before the
2Johnston v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688, 117 A.L.R.
1276 (1938), noted in 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 417, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 65 at 66.
13 Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923).
14Unconstitutional: Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup. Ct.,
1936), noted 35 Mich. L. Rev. 620 (1937); Consolidated Film Industries v.
Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489 (Sup. Ct., 1937) ; constitutional: Havender
v. Federal United Corp., 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A. (2d) 331 (Sup. Ct., 1940) ; see
discussion in Hottenstein et. al. v. York Ice Machinery Corporation, (C.C.A.,
3rd, 1943), 136 F. (2d) 944.
'5 Luce, "Legislative Amendment of Corporation Statutes-The Wisconsin Prob-
lem," 30 Marq. L. Rev. 20 (1946).
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statute was enacted.:6 So long as Kenosha, R. & R.L R.R. Co. v. Marsh7
remains unchallenged, the Ohio case is directly in point in Wisconsin
against any attempt in a merger or consolidation under the new statute
to eliminate accrued, cumulative dividends on stock acquired before
the effective date of the new statute. In New York, where the majority
view prevails as to the scope of the legislative rserved power, the oppo-
site result has been reached recently.'
The remedies of the dissenter against majority action under the
statutes considered may be classified broadly for discussion as follows:
(1) Action for conversion of the stock interest, or to enjoin or set
aside the proposed or accomplished action, (a) because, as to the dis-
senter, the statute under which the majority proceeded is unconstitu-
tional, or (b) because, admitting the validity of the statute and majority
authority to proceed under it, the majority action is illegal because of
noncompliance with the statutory procedure or because of majority
bad faith, unfairness, or other breach of equitable duty; (2) Action
under the procedure provided in the merger and consolidation statute
for appraisal of and payment for the dissenter's shares.
Shareholders who do not care to go along with the majority and
accept securities in a new or surviving corporation pursuant to a plan
of consolidation or merger may take advantage of the statutory apprai-
sal provided in the statute. They may have the "fair value" of their
shares as of the time of the stockholder action approving the plan
determined in a circuit court appraisal proceeding, if prior agreement
cannot be reached between the parties, and have the value so determined
paid to them by the new or surviving corporation. The steps which
the dissenting shareholder must take, as the merger or consolidation
process moves along, in order to preserve his statutory right to apprai-
sal of and payment for his shares are worthy of careful study by the
lawyer. The right to appraisal and payment is statutory and dependent
upon strict compliance with the prescribed statutory proceedure. 19
The appraisal remedy assumes affirmance by the dissenter of the
authority of the majority to proceed with the plan of merger or con-
solidation. The statute requires the dissenting shareholder: (1) to
express his objection in writing, filed with his corporation, at least
forty-eight hours before the stockholder's meeting called to approve
':6 Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127, 69 N.E. (2d) 187 (1946).
1' 17 Wis. 13 (1863).Is McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 253 (1945).
19 The cases have been strict in requiring precise compliance with the statutory
conditions precedent to the appraisal remedy: Stephenson v. Commonwealth &
Southern Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 447, 168 A. 211 (1933); In re Camden Trust Co.,
121 N.J.L. 222, 1 A. (2d) 475 (1938); Geiger v. American Seeding Machine
Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N.E. 594 (1931).
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the plan ;20 (2) not to vote for the plan, the statute apparently not re-
quiring him affirmatively to vote against it; (3) to make demand in
writing upon the surviving or new corporation within twenty days
after the merger or consolidation is effected, for payment of the fair
value of his shares, and (4) to wait out a conciliation period of thitry
days following the effective date of the merger or consolidation, before
his right matures under the statute to petition in circuit court within
sixty days thereafter for the appraised value of his shares as of the
day prior to the date of stockholder approval of the plan. Failure to
express dissent in the mode prescribed has the effect of binding the
stockholder to the terms of the merger or consolidation.
The appraisal remedy prescribed by the statute and outlined above
must be distinguished from the shareholder's suit to enjoin the execu-
tion of the plan, to set aside proceedings already completed under the
plan, or to recover damages for conversion of his stock interest, in
which suit the stockholder denies the authority of the statutory majority
to proceed with the plan because of its alleged illegality: (1) because
of the invalidity of the merger statute itself; (2) because of the failure
of the majority to follow the procedure prescribed in the merger and
consolidation statute, or (3) because the majority in the excercise
of its statutory power has in some manner violated its fiduciary duty
of fair play and good faith toward the minority interest in the corpora-
tion.21 The dissenter must commence an injunction action prior to, not
20 This provision furnishes advance information to management, in time conve-
niently to withdraw from the proposed reorganization, of the number of stock-
holders who will demand cash for their shares and refuse shares in the pro-
posed venture. However, the requirement goes far in forcing the doubtful
stockholder so far in advance to dissent in order to protect his position, without
much opportunity to make up his mind and without the benefit of discussion
and the reports at the meeting.
21 See Stevens v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W. (2d) 620 (1946);
Tanner v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904). It is commonly held
under such statutes as Ch. 15, Laws of 1947, that the statutory appraisal rem-
edy is not exclusive, and that the shareholder's remedies remain in equity.
Cole et. al. v. National Cash Credit Ass'n., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931);
Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567. 15 N.E. (2d) 127 (1938), interpreting
Ohio General Corporation Act, General Code, Sec. 8623-72; Vulcan Corp. v.
Westheimer & Co., 27 Ohio Abs. 694, App. dismissed, 135 Ohio St. 136, 19
N.E. (2d) 901 (1939) ; Goodisson v. North Am. Sec. Co., 40 Ohio App. 85, 178
N.E. 29 (1931); Wick v. Sheet and Tube Co., 46 Ohio App. 253, 188 N.E. 514(1932) ; Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers Given
to Majority Stockholders," 30 Mich. L. Rev. 645 (1932); Lattin, "Remedies
of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233(1931). The statutes governing. the appraisal remedy, in at least two states,
contain express provisions declaring the appraisal remedy to be exclusive:
California Civil Code (Deering, 1937), Sec. 369(17) ; Michigan General Cor-
poration Act (Act 327, P.A. 1931) Secs. 44, 54 (1943). For instance, Section
44(2) of the Michigan statute cited provides: "Objection by any such share-
holder to any action of the corporation provided in this section and his rights
thereafter under this section shall be his exclusive remedy." It has been held
that such a provision legislates common law equitable remedies of the dissenter
out of existence. See Lattin, "A Re-Appraisal of Appraisal Statutes," 38 Mich.
L. Rev. 1165 (1940), discussing such a case: Beechwood Securities Corpora-
tion, Inc. v. Associated Oil Company, (C.C.A. 9th, 1939), 104 F. (2d) 537.
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after, the effective date of the plan to make the action effective; and
the weight of business convenience in favor of the plan will make
a sizable bond likely as a condition to a temporary injunction.2 2 If
the dissenter loses on the hearing for permanent injunction, the same
thing will be true if he desires to maintain his position pending the out-
come of the appeal. The dissenter's most discouraging difficulty lies
in his extremely difficult burden of proof, which invariably makes the
outcome of such actions at least uncertain. 23 For instan, if a dissen-
ter desires to enjoin or set aside a merger or consolidation plan be-
cause, he contends, its sole purpose is to freeze him and his minority
group out of the business, will his burden of proof be to show the
subjective bad faith of the leaders of the majority group, or can he
satisfy the burden by demonstrating objectively the unfair operation of
the plan? There appears to be authority both ways. 24 In the cases
involving elimination of accrued cumulative dividends on preferred
stock, it is arguable from the results of the cases that the plan will be
considered illegal where, considering the business necessity for the
recapitalization, what the preferred will receive is not a fair equivalent
for what has been taken away.25 The cases in one state illustrate the
importance, in considering the issue of fairness, of the existence of
earned surplus available to pay the acrued dividends at the time of the
formulation of the plan.26 The vagueness of such tests, and their use-
lessness as a basis for prediction in any given situation without close
22 However, the dissenter may fail in an action for injunction filed too early in
the merger process. A stockholder was held not entitled to a temporary in-
junction restraining the holding of a stockholders' meeting to pass on a pro-
posed merger plan, because the holding of the meeting threatened no irre-
parable injury to him: McEnany v. American Car & Foundry Company, 56 F.
Supp. 3 (D.C.E.D.Pa., 1944).
23 There is a presumption that directors and majority stockholders based and
formed their judgment upon valuation of assets included in a marger or con-
solidation plan in good faith, and did not abuse their discretion or consciously
discriminate against the interests of minority stockholders: Cole v. National
Cash Credit Assoc., 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931).
24 "There also exists the inherent power of a court of equity, a power limited
generally to the test of good faith rather than a test objective in character, a
power the exercise of which may be circumscribed, because too often what is
an accomplished fact is presented to the court; but it is a significant restraining
influence nevertheless." Shientag, J. in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc.
835, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 253 at 262 (1945). The Delaware cases state that unfair-
ness must be so clearly demonstrated as to impel a conclusion of bad faith or
reckless indifference to the rights of others: Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp.,
(Del. Ch., 1943), 32 A. (2d) 148; Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (D.C.
Del., 1944) 53 F. Supp. 198; (C.C.A. 3rd, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 701; Koehler v.
St. Mary's Brewing Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 A. 1016 (1910); Wall v. Anaconda
Copper Mining Co., 216 Fed. 242 (D.C.Mont., 1914), aff'd, Wall v. Parrot
Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.S. 407 (1917).
25 Latty, "Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination,"
29 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1942); Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55
Harv. L. Rev. 780 (1942).
26 Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J.Eq. 271, 35 A. (2d) 215 (1944),
app. den. 135 N.J.Eq. 506, 39 A. (2d) 431; Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar
Co., 129 N.J.Eq. 322, 19 A. (2dJ 830 (1940).
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study of the facts in many cases, serve to illustrate again the uncer-
tainty of the dissenter's remedy for illegal action.
The dissenter may prefer to forego the possibility of injunction, and
contest the legality of the plan in an action for conversion of his stock
interest. The same difficulties of proof are present as in the injunction
action, but the reward may well be a higher measure of recovery than
that afforded by the fair value measure used in the statutory appraisal
remedy.27 However, the conversion remedy is uncertain, and its loss
will leave the dissenter with his statutory appraisal remedy forfeited
through lapse of time; unless he is allowed to plead the conversion
claim as an alternative cause of action in the statutory petition in cir-
cuit court for appraisal of his shares. The causes of action are logically
inconsistent, and the problem of election of remedies is involved. The
consolidation and merger statute does not contain express authority for
such alternative pleading in the circuit court petition of such a logically
inconsistent cause of action. However, general authority is available
under the code for such alternative pleading.28
The significance of the short cut procedure provided by the consol-
idation and merger statute for the legal unification of two or more cor-
porate business organizations, at least one of which is a Wisconsin
corporation, can best be realized after a glance at the procedure avail-
able heretofore under Wisconsin statutes for such unification. It must
be remembered that in the absence of enabling legislation, unification
through such procedure as that provided in Chapter 15, Laws of 1947,
is legally impossible, in the same sense that corporations themselves,
as we define them, are inconceivable in the absence of state authoriza-
tion in the form either of special or general legislation.29 Unification of
a Wisconsin corporation with one or more other corporations has been
accomplished in the past through resort to other corporate powers, and
has involved legal procedure far more complicated, time-consuming,
and expensive than that necessary under Chapter 15. One corporation
can make another its subsidiary by acquiring all of its stock pursuant
to authority found in Wisconsin Statutes, Section 182.01 (10), and
thus achieve a degree of unification. 30 A well known and used proce-
dure is that of sale by a corporation of all its assets to another corpora-
tion in exchange for stock in the latter, to be followed by dissolution
2 7 Equitable Trust Company v. Columbia Nat. Bank, 145 S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811(1927), where the court permitted recovery of the par value of plaintiff's
shares, amounting to $2,500, plus punitive damages in the amount of $2,500;
Jones v. Missouri-Edison Elec. Co., 144 Fed. 765, (C.C.A. 8th, 1906); Tanner
v. Lindell Ry., 180 Mo. 1, 79 S.W. 155 (1904).
28 Bischoff v. Hustisford State Bank, 195 Wis. 312, 218 N.W. 353 (1928); 36 Yale
L. J. 711; 22 Col. L. R. 593; Petry v. Harwood Elec. Co., 280 Pa. 142, 124 A.
302 (1924).
29 St. Thomas Gemeinde v. St. Matthews Church, 191 Wis. 340, 210 N.W. 942(1926).30Hoberg v. John Hoberg Co., 170 Wis. 50, 173 N.W. 639 (1919).
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of the selling corporation and distribution to its members of the stock
received in the sale of assets. Statutes in many states provide specially
for this procedure, with provision for appraisal and payment for the
shares of dissenters.3' This procedure obviously involves numerous
property transfers; often requires amendment of the articles of the
buying corporation to authorize increase of capital stock, and finally
dissolution proceedings to dispose of the selling corporation. It is not
clear that such procedure is authorized in the case of business corpora-
tions under Wisconsin statutes. The only authority is found in Section
180.11 (2), which provides: "Every corporation may, by a vote of a
majority of the stock entitled to vote, sell and convey * * * all * * * of
the property owned by it, or mortgage or lease any such property
whenever it shall be necessary for its business or the protection or
benefit of its property." This section must be interpreted in the light
of the so-called common law cases dealing with majority power to sell
corporate assets in the absence of express statutory authority. Such
cases held that the majority of stockholders had power to sell all the
assets of a corporation for cash whenever the financial situation of the
corporation was such that insolvency existed, or was threatened, and
there were no reasonable prospects of future success."1 The sale of
all the assets of a solvent, going concern; and the sale of all the assets
for stock in another corporation under any circumstances, were both
under the general rule beyond majority power and required unanimous
stockholder approval.3 3 A few cases held that sale for stock could be
authorized by the majority over minority dissent where financial exi-
gencies made sale for cash permissible, provided the stock received had
an established market value, and was the practical equivalent of cash.34
Section 180.11 (2) has recently been interpreted to effect a de-
parture from the common law cases, and to authorize sale of all the
assets through majority action in a solvent, going concern. The Court
stated that the limitation in the statute: "'whenever it shall be neces-
sary for its business or the protection or benefit of its property' refers
to the mortgage or leasing of the corporate property and not to its
sale." 5 However, it does not appear that the Avalon Realty Company
case involved a sale other than for cash. The statute certainly does not
3" Ohio, General Corporation Act, General Code, Sec. 8623-65, 8623-72; Delaware,
General Corporation Law, Rev. Code, Ch. 65, Sec. 65.
32 Allied Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486
(1923); 6 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., Sec. 2946 (1931); 13
Ibid., Sec. 5798; 15 Ibid., Sec. 7216; Warren, "Voluntary Transfers of Corpo-
rate Undertakings," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 335 (1917).
"3 Barry v. Interstate Refineries, Inc., 13 F. (2d) 249 (D.C.W.D.Mo., 1926);
American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (C.C.A. 6th, 1923); but see
Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 7 Gray 393 (Mass., 1856).
34 Comment, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 626 (1937); Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining
Co., 254 U.S. 590, 65 L. ed. 425, 41 S. Ct. 209 (1921).
35 Gottschalk v. Avalon Realty Co., 249 Wis. 78 at 84, 23 N.W. (2d) 606 (1946).
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expressly authorize a sale for stock in another corporation under any
circumstances, and judicial authority for such action by the majority
is meager and unsatisfactory.36 It might be noted here that such pro-
cedure is expressly authorized by Wisconsin statute in the case of coop-
erative associations.3 7
To examine still further into possible alternatives, the managers of
a Wisconsin corporation, upon a two-thirds vote of stockholders, could
dissolve the corporation; distribute the assets to the stockholders after
paying debts, assuming distribution could be effected in kind; and have
the stockholders convey the property to a new corporation in exchange
for its stock. Besides involving an extra set of property transfers, such
method of reorganization would involve difficulties arising from pas-
sage of titles through individuals, and loss of control over dissenters
resulting in probable loss to the business of any property distributed
to dissenters under the plan. Whether the managers of the winding
up of the corporation could sell the assets to the new corporation in
exchange for its stock under their power to "dispose of and convey
all its property * * * and divide the residue of the money and other
property among the stockholders * * *,,3 seems at least questionable.
It becomes quite clear that the addition to Wisconsin corporation
legislation of the consolidation and merger procedure, created by Chap-
ter 15, Laws of 1947, may prove a valuable and useful one.
SB Consolidated Water Power Co. v. Nash, 109 Wis. 490, 85 N.W. 485 (1901);
McDermott v. O'Neil Oil Co., 200 Wis..423, 228 N.W. 481 (1930).
- Wis. Stat. (1945), Sec. 185.12; Pearson v. Clam Falls C-op. Dairy Ass'n, 243
Wis. 369, 10 N.W. (2d) 132 (1943).
38 Wis. Stats., Sec. 181.02.
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